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Executive summary 
Policy context 
Australia’s recently released National Primary Health Care Strategic Framework aims to improve 
access and reduce inequity in health care using a range of strategies including funding models and 
incentives as mechanisms to promote high quality care. Currently, the Australian health system relies 
on a mixed funding model with a focus on fee-for-service, which does not actively reward quality of 
care. Blended models, which include financial incentives such as pay for performance (P4P), have 
been proposed to encourage improvements in the quality and safety of health care provided, and the 
uptake and meaningful use of electronic health records (EHRs). Nevertheless, incentives are not 
sufficient to impact on care provision without both appropriate infrastructure and the engagement 
of general practice. 
 
Key findings 
Quality improvement includes aspects of self-reflection and benchmarking, with continued 
evaluation to identify where additional improvements to practice can be made. Measures of the 
quality of care are typically structure (e.g. related to an organisation’s operations), process (e.g. 
clinical guidelines or care pathways) or outcomes-based (e.g. physiological indicators). Improvements 
can be measured in relative or absolute terms. The likelihood of engaging with incentives and the 
behavioural responses of health professionals are affected by the different characteristics of financial 
incentives, which may be directed at networks of practices, individual practices, or specific health 
care professionals. Payments may be offered as a bonus or addition to usual earnings, or may be 
withheld if practices do not achieve desired outcomes. Payments may be prospective or 
retrospective and may be linked to fixed thresholds or individual patients. 
 
In Australia, sets of clinical indicators for quality improvement have been developed and are 
continually revised by the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners and the Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care. These standards assist general practices and 
practitioners to establish and implement processes to monitor and improve the quality of their 
chosen services. Similarly, specific financial incentive schemes such as the Practice Incentives 
Program incorporate P4P (with sign on and service incentive payments) and practice-based capacity 
payments. It is not clear whether the incentives improve quality of care, as the evidence of 
effectiveness is limited and the results are not robust. P4P incentives have been shown to have some 
influence on diabetes care, but there is also evidence to suggest that while signing on to services may 
demonstrate high uptake, services are often provided, but not claimed through the incentive 
program (Greene, 2013). 
 
The United Kingdom’s quality improvement approach relates to the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) introduced in 2004. Coordinated by PHC organisations, this payment-for-quality 
scheme comprises 146 indicators, with related payments constituting up to one-third of a practice’s 
income. Absolute improvements have been seen with a number of indicators including control of 
blood sugar levels among patients with diabetes, and provision of smoking cessation advice 
(Kontopantelis et al., 2013). Diabetes care is a particular focus of the QOF scheme, with ten per cent 
of the total indicators allocated to this condition. The QOF also includes a large investment in 
technology which is likely to have contributed to increases in recorded levels of care. Criticisms of the 
approach relate to the readily achievable levels of indicator targets, which provide little risk to 
practice incomes and little incentive for improvements over and above the specified levels. Enhanced 
Services are another significant financial incentive or lever in the UK quality improvement approach 
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towards specific diseases. General practitioners affiliated with Local Enhanced Services had a higher 
probability of achieving QOF diabetes indicators than those without involvement of these 
community-based services.  
 
In the United States, there is widespread application of P4P incentives. Clinical quality is most 
commonly incentivised, with over 60 per cent of programs offering bonus payments rather than 
withholding approaches, and the majority of programs providing one annual payment. In 2007, a 
pay-for-reporting model was introduced (the Physician Quality Reporting System) with physicians 
entitled to a lump sum payment if they met the criteria for submitting quality data based on a set of 
74 indicators. The 2010 Affordable Care Act made public reporting of quality measures compulsory. 
There has been particular emphasis in the US on EHRs with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services delivering a successful EHR incentive program to encourage transition to, adoption of, and 
meaningful use of EHRs. Evaluated P4P programs have illustrated benefits for clinical outcomes such 
as depression severity, appropriate prescribing, blood pressure control and smoking cessation 
(Bardach et al., 2013, Unützer et al., 2012).  
 
Canada has a predominantly fee-for-service system though the different regions have their own 
approaches to using financial incentives for quality improvement. The Health Council of Canada is 
responsible for monitoring progress in improving the quality of the health system, whereas local 
councils have been established to support initiatives operating at provincial and territorial levels. 
Canadian incentives for preventive services (incorporating two parts: contacting patients and 
achieving high rates of coverage) have enabled improvements for provision of influenza vaccinations, 
pap smears, mammograms and colorectal cancer screening (Hurley et al., 2011, Lau et al., 2012). In 
some cases, the incentivised actions required additional infrastructure or equipment, hence uptake 
was limited among practices. In contrast, where incentives were linked to current standard practices, 
uptake occurred more readily. 
 
In 2010, a Health Quality and Safety Commission was established to lead a national quality program 
in New Zealand. However, much of the Commission’s focus was on hospitals. Currently, there is 
limited information available about financial incentives in PHC in NZ, with a proposed shift towards 
non-financial incentives as drivers for improvements in quality. Capitation funding is widespread in 
NZ though there are additional funds available for primary health organisations working to address 
chronic disease management, health promotion and improving access. In 2006, the Primary Health 
Organisation Performance Management Programme was developed and included P4P against 
performance indicators as a core component, yet, despite positive preliminary results and the 
availability of Primary Health Organisations’, District Health Boards’ and National performance 
scores, no formal evaluation data are available. 
 
Across all literature in this review, there was a lack of explicit acknowledgement of whether the 
outcomes measured were absolute or relative improvement.  
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Policy considerations 
Based on the findings of this report, the following points may be considered 
Who gets paid? 
• Information is lacking about distribution of payments 
• There is a range of different systems with some incentives directed at groups or organisations 
and others directed at individuals 
• Future programs should acknowledge that team-based care is central to PHC  
How much is enough? 
• Strength of financial incentives is often not well reported  
• Low incentives are unlikely to motivate behaviour change and/or the administrative burden 
related to claiming a minimal reward may not be worthwhile 
• High incentives raise overall health system costs and perverse incentives may prevail 
• A tiered series of tiered or differentiating targets based on baseline performance and/or a 
piece-rate payment approach may be used for each appropriately managed patient 
What are the consequences? 
• Crowding in/out, exception rates, and gaming 
• Coercive behaviour by GPs towards patients considered as non-compliant 
• Conflict within workplaces by directing incentives at GPs 
• The administrative burden of making claims for funds may be a disincentive especially in 
regions lacking resources or infrastructure (i.e. rural and remote) 
Absolute versus relative improvement 
• Absolute improvement is defined as the change in performance from baseline to follow-up; 
relative improvement is defined as the absolute improvement divided by the difference 
between the baseline performance and perfect performance (100%)  
• Absolute targets are likely to be more effective than relative targets because they are 
transparent and create less uncertainty regarding the efforts to be eligible for payment  
• Relative targets may reduce collaboration and dissemination of best practices because they 
encourage competition  
Lack of quality data 
• Challenges of publicly reported data, large datasets and limited enrolled populations  
• Inconsistent units of analysis across evaluations of incentive effectiveness  
Other influencers 
• Processes and workforce availability 
• Complexity of billing, administrative burden 
• Accreditation processes, practice population composition and marketing of incentives affect 
practices’ willingness and ability to engage with incentives  
• The use of financial incentives alongside a range of non-financial incentives and other quality 
improvement strategies (i.e. performance tables, professional standards). 
 
Methods 
A thorough (non-systematic) reviewed of literature (Australia, UK, US, Canada and NZ) was 
undertaken with materials, published between 2011 and 2014, collected from academic and grey 
sources including but not limited to PubMed Trove, Google Scholar, Cochrane Database of 
Systematic Reviews, and Government websites. Key search terms included: “quality improvement”, 
“financial incentive”, and “pay for performance”. 
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Context 
One of the key strategic outcomes in the National Primary Health Care Strategic Framework 
(Standing Council on Health, 2013) is to improve access and reduce inequity in health care:  
Primary health care is delivered through an integrated service system which provides high 
quality care across the country and actively addresses service gaps (Standing Council on Health, 
2013, p 17). 
 
Potential actions to achieve this outcome include exploring “funding models that include incentives 
for a focus on the health of the population, promote safety and quality and reduce preventable 
hospitalisations through primary and secondary prevention” (Strategic Outcome 2.3; p 18); and 
maximising “opportunities of eHealth, including the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record 
(PCEHR) and Secure Messaging initiatives” (Strategic Outcome 2.5; p 13). 
 
Australia’s current mixed funding model has a strong focus on fee-for-service (FFS) in the private 
health care sector (e.g. general practice), and salary arrangements in the publicly funded sector (e.g. 
hospitals). Quality of care is often not rewarded in these arrangements. Governments are continually 
reassessing blended payment systems to include financial incentives, such as payment for 
performance (P4P), which has the potential to achieve improvements in quality and safety of health 
care. Examples of financial incentives in Australia include the General Practice Immunisation 
Incentive Scheme (GPII), which provided bonus payments to general practitioners (GPs) for achieving 
immunisation targets (ended in May 2013); and the Practice Incentives Program (PIP), which provides 
bonus payments for practices that deliver improvements in any of ten different activities. For 
example, one of the PIP programs relates to encouraging adoption of eHealth technology “as it 
becomes available” (Medicare, 2013). To be eligible, practices are required to implement five key 
electronic processes: electronic health records (EHR); secure messaging; electronic clinical coding; 
electronic prescribing; and the PCEHR system. It is anticipated that the introduction of eHealth will 
positively impact on the quality of health care services in Australia by facilitating continuity of care 
and medical information flow.  
 
However, establishment of the required infrastructure on its own is not sufficient to impact on 
quality and safety in primary health care (PHC). General practice engagement and application of an 
innovative approach with appropriate tools and capacity at the patient level is required to realise the 
full potential. There is a need to identify more effective ways of engaging GP support in the 
implementation of new systems and technologies in the Australian setting; and to encourage 
participation in schemes that foster continuous quality improvement.  
 
This report reviews financial incentives that encourage improvements in the quality and safety of 
PHC, including how they have been implemented and how effective they have been. A key focus is 
examining strategies that assess and reward relative improvement in quality of care; and identifying 
patient-level measures that can be used to assess the effectiveness of any given quality improvement 
program and its associated initiatives. 
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Background 
 
Quality improvement has been defined as a process within general practice through which the 
individuals who provide care adopt various approaches to self-reflection and benchmarking in 
order to understand and address the reasons for poor quality or variations in quality, and to 
identify where acceptable quality can be improved further. (Goodwin et al., 2011, p 27) 
 
The Donabedian (1988) Model continues to be the dominant paradigm for assessing the quality of 
health care. The dimensions of care which the framework covers represent three types of 
information that may be collected in order to draw inferences about quality of care in a given 
system. Table 1 provides information about the framework, types of measures, targeted parts of the 
care process and examples of the measures and how they might be assessed. It is important to clarify 
that there is often confusion between process and proxy-outcome measures. For example, 
incorporating EHRs into general practice is a structure-based measure, whereas a GP using the EHR 
to record patient information or refer patients to other providers is process-based.  
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Table 1 Types of measures for assessing quality of care based on Donabedian's Framework 
Measure type Description Targets Examples How measured 
Structure-based Encompasses all the factors 
that affect the context in 
which care is delivered 
Structures, systems and processes in 
place to assure the quality and 
accountability of an organisation 
Facilities 
Equipment 
Personnel 
Administration 
Protocols 
Direct observation 
Supervisory checklists 
Process-based The sum of all actions that 
make up health care 
Commonly includes diagnosis, 
treatment, preventive care, and 
patient education  
Clinical guidelines 
Care pathways 
Management 
Records 
Diagnosis 
Treatment plan 
Sequencing 
Participant observation 
Exit interviews 
Data quality assessment 
Outcome-based Contains all the effects of 
health care on patients or 
populations 
Clinical, physiological & patient-
centred 
Mortality 
Quality of life 
Patient satisfaction 
Health status 
Completion of 
treatment 
Patient/population 
surveys 
*only structure and process can be manipulated 
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It is important to recognise that information about quality lies on a continuum from measures that 
are routinely available and data that are quantifiable, through to aspects of the quality of care that 
are more difficult to quantify and can only be measured through local audit, patient feedback and 
other qualitative methodologies. For example, assessing whether a patient is receiving effective care 
coordination requires service use data in addition to qualitative approaches. These include review 
meetings, case notes, general practice team meetings to identify, analyse and address quality issues, 
and proactive input from patient groups on the care they receive and experience of that care 
(Goodwin et al., 2011). 
 
Improvements in quality of care (i.e. patient care, drug effectiveness, patient status and other key 
metrics) can be measured in relative or absolute terms. Absolute improvement is defined as the 
change in performance from baseline to follow-up; relative improvement is defined as the absolute 
improvement divided by the difference between the baseline performance and perfect performance 
(100%) (Jencks et al., 2003).  
 
Different characteristics of financial incentives used in health care can influence the magnitude and 
direction of behavioural responses by physicians, including the method, type and timing of the 
incentive (Scott et al., 2011). The method of payment refers to payments being made in exchange for 
a variety of behaviours (Table 2). Payments may be offered as a bonus on top of usual earnings, or 
payments may be withheld from practices that did not achieve desired incentives (Scott et al., 2011). 
The timing of payments is also relevant to behaviour and may occur in advance (i.e. prospective 
payments) or after the behaviour has taken place (i.e. retrospective); and where there is no overall 
limit or where there is a cap on the total payments that can be made. 
 
Table 2 Characteristics of financial incentives 
Method of payment Description  
Salary Payment for working over a specified time period 
Fee-for-Service (FFS) Payment for providing specific services 
Capitation Payment for providing care to a specific population 
Pay-for-performance (P4P) Payment for providing a pre-specified or increase in level of quality 
of care 
Timing of payment  
Linear Payment is made for each additional unit of service 
Non-linear Payment is conditional on reaching a threshold or benchmark, or 
the amount paid changes with each additional service 
 
In terms of P4P specifically, payments can be offered with either a ‘tournament’ or a ‘piece-rate’ 
approach. ‘Tournament’ or ‘all or nothing’ methods have fixed thresholds that must be reached for 
the incentive to be rewarded. One of the challenges of this approach is that it may prevent physicians 
from attempting to improve beyond the threshold. The ‘piece-rate’ model encourages continuous 
improvement and reduces the likelihood of health professionals avoiding high-risk patients by 
rewarding physicians for each patient who receives quality care or achieves a benchmark. For 
example, each patient with diabetes receives HbA1c testing twice a year (Chien et al., 2012, Chien et 
al., 2010).  
 
The most recent systematic review of financial incentives and quality of care suggests that within the 
current literature there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial 
incentives to improve the quality of PHC provided by primary care physicians (Scott et al., 2011). 
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Scott and colleagues suggest that the evidence is inconclusive because the evidence-base is limited, 
due to inconsistency in descriptions and poor reporting in the literature. This review will examine 
strategies that assess (measure), reward (incentivise) and influence quality improvement in general 
practice. This review includes financial incentives which reward relative and absolute improvements. 
 
Aims and research questions 
Specific questions and areas to be addressed in this review include: 
• What international and national financial incentive schemes (including P4P) are relevant to 
quality improvement in PHC in the Australian setting? 
o Focus on schemes that reward relative improvement (though not limited to these) 
o Focus on schemes that include meaningful use of eHealth (i.e. beyond uptake) 
• What financial incentives have effectively demonstrated improvements in quality of care? 
o To what extent have they changed provider behaviour? 
o To what extent have they improved health outcomes for patients? 
• What are the potential barriers to financial incentives for quality improvement? 
• What are the potential unintended consequences of financial incentives?  
• What are the strengths of effective financial incentives?  
• How have data been collected and used to influence performance?  
o What measures of relative and absolute quality improvement have been 
implemented?  
o To what extent have they been validated?  
 
Methods 
This report followed a ‘rapid review’ format (Grant and Booth, 2009). Rapid reviews are pragmatic 
literature reviews that focus on research evidence, with a view to facilitating evidence-based policy 
development. A range of peer-reviewed and grey literature sources were explored to identify 
relevant literature for this review. Once relevant material was located, a snowballing approach was 
used to identify additional material. Information was sourced from PubMed (with the PHC Search 
Filter), Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, TROVE, OpenGrey, GoogleScholar and 
Government websites. A set of keywords and subject headings were used to search each database 
(terms used were database dependent) around ‘quality improvement’, ‘financial incentive’, and ‘pay 
for performance’. Abstracts were reviewed for suitability based on their relevance to PHC, GPs and 
the general practice setting. 
 
The literature used in the review was limited to those sources published between 2011 and 2014. 
This specific time frame was selected in order to find material that would complement Scott et al.’s 
(2011) recent systematic review of financial incentives. Further, information on financial incentives in 
other countries was limited primarily to New Zealand (NZ), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and the 
United States (US) where relevant. These countries were selected on the basis that they were 
perceived as being comparable countries in terms of the organisation, funding and delivery of PHC; 
or that they had a diversity of innovative models that may be used to inform policy in the Australian 
setting. It must be acknowledged that many other types of incentives also exist in other countries. 
However, due to language and time constraints, information sources were limited to those written in 
English. While information from countries other than those listed above was not explicitly excluded, 
specific searches for literature of other countries were not undertaken. In addition, in order to avoid 
duplication of effort and keep this review focused on current programs targeting quality 
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improvement and financial incentives, the most recent systematic review has been summarised in 
the background section of the report. 
 
Findings 
Australia 
Quality improvement approach 
In March 2012, the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP) (2013) Council 
endorsed a small set of clinical indicators as a quality improvement tool for piloting in general 
practice. The intent of these indicators was to provide general practices with a voluntary tool to aid 
them in establishing, implementing and developing processes to monitor and improve the quality of 
their chosen services. The focus of the indicators is on the professionalism and diversity of general 
practice, targeting outcomes that are relevant to improved patient outcomes. At the same time, the 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care finalised indicators also designed for 
voluntary inclusion in quality improvement strategies at the local practice or service level. These are 
intended for local use by organisations and individuals providing PHC services (ACSQHC, 2012). It 
must be noted that recommendations regarding indicators for general practice were not in scope for 
the review outcomes. The RACGP, with other PHC stakeholder engagement, released the 4th edition 
of the Standards for General Practice in May 2013. These are designed to be a template for delivery 
of safe quality care in the increasingly complex Australian general practice environment; this 
document specifies 38 fewer indicators and more explanatory material and additional resources 
(Royal Australian College of General Practice, 2013). Practices can choose to be assessed against the 
Standards by an independent third party to gain formal ‘accreditation’. Achieving independent 
accreditation against the Standards shows patients that the practice is serious about providing high 
quality, safe and effective care to standards of excellence determined by the general practice 
profession. 
 
Incentive schemes for quality improvement 
Established in 1998 to support general practice, the Practice Incentives Program (PIP) refers to a 
voluntary scheme administered by the Australian Department of Health and currently comprising ten 
incentives. Of interest to this report are the five incentives related to prescribing, diabetes, cervical 
screening, asthma and Indigenous health. Three of these are P4P incentives (diabetes, asthma, 
cervical screening) while the remainder are considered practice-based capacity payments (i.e. 
eHealth). P4P PIP incentives have two components—the sign-on payment and the service incentive 
payment (SIP). Diabetes and cervical screening also have outcomes payments targeted towards 
practices meeting a certain threshold (Medicare, 2014). In 2008-09, 67 per cent of practices across 
Australia were enrolled in the PIP, with average payments of AUS$19 700 per full-time equivalent GP 
in participating practices. The PIP accounts for 5.5 per cent of Government funding for general 
practice (Willcox, 2011).  
 
There have been significant organisational changes since the introduction of PIP (Willcox, 2011). Solo 
practices have halved and six of every ten practices now employ five or more GPs. Larger general 
practices were fostered due to general practice accreditation requirements and a trend towards 
corporatisation. Practice nurses are part of the general practice landscape more than ever, with 79 
per cent of GPs working in practices with at least one practice nurse. 
 
Quality improvement financial incentives for general practitioners - 9 - 
Primary Health Care Research & Information Service 
phcris.org.au 
Evidence of effectiveness 
In a recent good quality, mixed methods study, Greene (2013) examined the impact of a subset of 
P4P incentives on Australian GPs. In particular, this study focused on the payment of AUS$40 and 
AUS$100 in addition to FFS for providing patients with recommended diabetes and asthma 
treatment over a year, and AUS$35 for screening women for cervical cancer who had not been 
screened in the last four years. The investigation attempted to triangulate the program’s impact by 
examining both quantitative and qualitative data.  
 
The first component of Greene’s (2013) study tracked the use of four incentivised services by GPs to 
see whether they promoted changes in provider behaviour. By identification of unique billing codes 
in publicly available Medicare claims data, the researchers were able to describe whether there was 
an increase in the annual number of diabetes-related and cervical screening tests, pre-
implementation (1995-2000) and post-implementation (2001-2010). The second component 
followed a unique panel subset of GPs from 2000 to 2009 (N=1 131). For inclusion in this randomly 
selected study sample, GPs had to be active at a given practice site (i.e. billed a minimum of 375 
Medicare claims of any type in 2000). GPs from low socio-economic status (SES) areas were 
oversampled to examine whether there were differential program impacts for GPs practicing in areas 
of lower and higher SES. Two measures of P4P participation were utilised, one referring to whether a 
GP’s practice was signed on to the specific incentive (diabetes or cervical cancer screening) and 
another which related to the number of services provided that were relevant PIP incentives 
(Diabetes: HbA1c and microalbumin; cervical cancer: diagnosis and treatment). The third component 
of the study included in-depth interviews with an Australia-wide convenience sample (N=13 GPs; N=2 
practice managers) in 2011. The semi-structured interview guide included questions about why the 
practice did or did not sign on to the incentive program; what the participants’ experience had been 
with each incentive; and the perceived influence of the incentive on behaviour and practice norms.  
 
Findings from Greene’s (2013) study indicated that, despite the incentives, diabetes service claims 
were infrequent relative to the number of HbA1c tests (11-17%) and microalbumin tests (20-30%) 
billed; that is, services were provided, but not claimed through the incentive program. However, the 
low number of diabetes incentive claims lodged was actually six times higher than the number of 
asthma incentive claims lodged. For cervical cancer screening and treatment, there were small 
increases in the number of both screens in the year pre-implementation of P4P incentives. When the 
incentive began, there was a five per cent increase in the number of screens, but this was not 
sustained throughout the periods analysed. 
 
While two-thirds of Greene’s (2013) longitudinal sample signed on to the incentives within the first 
full year of them becoming available, the majority made no incentive claims in the year, though a 
small subset made more than ten incentive claims. However, by 2008, 31 per cent of the sample of 
GPs claimed more than ten diabetes incentive payments. Over time, increases for cervical cancer 
incentives were modest and, whilst participation increased, the actual number of claims for asthma 
incentives decreased; it was not specified as to whether this was a significant decrease. GPs who 
actively participated in the incentive program in 2005 had much higher baseline levels of HbA1c 
testing, and they did not increase testing more than non-participating GPs. This suggests that GPs 
who were already providing high quality care signed on to the program, but did not show 
improvement, whereas those that may need to improve did not sign on. However, neither signing on 
to the incentive program nor the number of incentive payments claimed by a GP in a year was 
significantly associated with the number of diabetes tests or cervical cancer screens provided. For the 
diabetes incentive, GPs were quick to sign on, but uptake of claiming was more gradual. By 2009, 31 
per cent of GPs claimed more than ten incentive payments, up from 14 per cent in 2002.  
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The qualitative analysis revealed GPs who claimed the P4P did not believe the incentives influenced 
the way they treated patients. However, several challenges and enablers emerged from the 
qualitative data. The diabetes cycle of care was spoken about favourably and the list of behaviours 
based on this tool had helped GPs self-audit regardless of whether they submitted a claim. In 
contrast, participants acknowledged the burden of tracking patients, complexity of billing and the 
relatively modest incentive payment as barriers to uptake and meaningful use of these incentives. 
Additionally, few GPs had nurses available to assist them with tracking cycles of care. Separate billing 
codes for payments, and the lack of automated system was a further source of frustration. An 
integrated system that worked with EHRs was recommended (Greene, 2013).  
 
Challenges of the Australian approach 
Although there was no measurement of patient-centred experience or health outcomes, much of the 
criticism of the available research is based on the limitations of the data used. Greene (2013) 
identified that the asthma cycle of care does not include any procedures that are billed separately, 
thereby limiting the ability to track changes in asthma quality of care. This is a major limitation in 
using Medicare data as a measure for quality of care. However, a more serious flaw identified by 
Bayram and colleagues (2013) is that Medicare claims data do not accurately represent the 
pathology tests ordered by GPs. Since there is not a Medicare number for each test ordered by GPs, 
tests are grouped by pathologists for claiming purposes into their appropriate Medicare test item 
(Bayram et al., 2013). HbA1c and microalbumin have item numbers and, theoretically, there should 
be a Medicare claim for each test ordered. However, the Medicare funding system incorporates an 
‘episode cone’ whereby payments to pathologists for Medicare testing are limited to the three most 
expensive items. Any remaining tests are coned out, and research by the Australian Association of 
Pathology identified that between 39 to 64 per cent of HbA1c and 11 to 22 percent of microalbumin 
tests were coned out. Thus the Medicare data under-represent actual billing for these types of tests, 
resulting in insufficient granularity of data for actual services rendered. Bayram and colleagues’ 
(2013) data suggest that there has actually been a steady increase in GPs ordering HbA1c and 
microalbumin for the management of diabetes since the implementation of the P4P diabetes 
incentive. The authors reiterate the need for researchers to be aware of the limitations of 
administrative data systems, such as Medicare claims, before using the data as a measure of the 
effectiveness of a Government intervention.  
 
PIP payments originally represented a significant share of practice income but this has decreased 
significantly and in 2008-09, it was only 5.5 per cent (Willcox et al., 2011). In some cases, PIP alone 
may not always be the most suitable means for delivering an incentive that is applicable to the entire 
general practice community. For example, accreditation, the entry requirement to receive PIP 
incentives, can be a significant barrier to certain general practices including Aboriginal Medical 
Services and smaller practices servicing remote locations and non‐English speaking communities 
which have been underrepresented in PIP (Australian National Audit Office, 2010). The cost and work 
effort needed for accreditation are regarded by over 80 per cent of the Audit Office survey 
respondents as ‘high’ or ‘very high’ (Australian National Audit Office, 2010). 
 
The level of PIP payment is adjusted using the standardised whole patient equivalent (SWPE) to 
account for practices’ patient load1 and location using the Rural, Remote and Metropolitan Areas 
(RRMA) classification (Australian National Audit Office, 2010). These adjustments can have 
1 Patient load is the proportion of care a practice provides to each patient using the value of the patient’s MBS fees and then weighted 
using an age-sex factor. 
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unintended consequences for some practices, distorting uptake or incentives, thereby not achieving 
the intended outcome. For example, the SWPE was designed to reward practices that spent more 
time with individual patients; whereas, in effect, it provides greater payments to practices that have 
higher numbers of patient visits as opposed to fewer, longer consultations. The other central factor 
in determining PIP payments, RRMA, is based on outdated 1991 Australian Bureau of Statistics 
census data and is not used consistently by the Department of Health. In addition, a district can be 
assigned different RRMA categories under different programs. 
 
Strengths of the Australian approach 
The PIP is considered a well-established part of payment arrangements for quality in general 
practice. It was estimated in 2007-08 that the proportion of practices participating in the PIP was 
around 67 per cent (equivalent to all accredited practices) (Willcox et al., 2011) providing nearly 82 
per cent of general practice care in Australia (Australian National Audit Office, 2014). Participating 
practices believe that the PIP has contributed to quality care and improved access, as has been 
supported by evidence in recent reviews (Greene, 2013).  
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United Kingdom 
Quality improvement approach 
Over the last 15 years, the UK National Health Service (NHS) has undergone a series of reforms aimed 
at quality improvement, particularly around chronic conditions. This led to the creation of the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence and the introduction of National Service 
Frameworks which set minimum standards for the delivery of health services in specified clinical 
areas. Introduced in 2004, the UK’s Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is much broader than 
the Australian PIP in terms of breadth of domains included in its payment framework and the 
magnitude of its potential payments. The QOF has been described as “more than a payment scheme” 
(Gillam et al., 2012, p 461) as it consists of a number of elements including financial incentives and 
information technology (computerised prompts and decision support), designed to promote 
structured and team-based care. It is a complex intervention with the aim of achieving evidence-
based quality targets. (Siriwardena, 2010). Currently, there are 131 indicators relevant to quality of 
care. Payments through the QOF can constitute as much as one-third of a practice’s income. The QOF 
was introduced with the intention to improve GPs’ pay, conditions and satisfaction.  
 
Incentive schemes for quality improvement 
The UK QOF is one of the most comprehensive and well-studied approaches to quality improvement 
and financial incentives for GPs. Introduced in 2004, this payment-for-quality scheme is the system 
for the performance management and payment of GPs in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. The QOF system is supervised and audited by Clinical Commissioning Groups in England and 
the analogous PHC organisations elsewhere in the UK, which make the related payments (National 
Health Service, 2013b). In 2004, new contractual arrangements for family doctors in the UK allowed 
them to opt out of out-of-hours care and linked financial incentives to quality of care under the QOF. 
This model is considered the largest and most ambitious P4P scheme ever attempted in health care 
(Kontopantelis et al., 2013). The framework comprises 76 clinical indicators and 70 indicators 
pertaining to practice organisation and patient experience. Eighteen of the clinical indicators pertain 
to care for patients with diabetes. Other payment approaches in the UK include Payment by Results, 
which is more suited to instances where technical efficiency is the focus (i.e. hospital services) 
(Appleby et al., 2012). Commissioning for Outcomes-Based incentivised contracts (COBIC) is another 
approach in which contracting replaces a variety of fragmented, individually negotiated contracts 
with a single integrated tender, forcing providers to respond differently to target specific 
populations. One such example is the substance misuse case study in Milton Keynes (Corrigan and 
Hicks, 2011). 
 
In addition to the QOF, the NHS has also commissioned new Enhanced Services as a financial lever 
which focuses on quality improvement (National Health Service, 2013a). These include guidance and 
audit for alcohol-related risk, learning disabilities, immunisations, dementia screening, patient access 
to online resources, remote care monitoring, preparation and support. This lever has three 
categories: Direct Enhanced Service (DES); National Enhanced Services (NES); and Locally Enhanced 
Services (LES). A number of NES/DES can be considered as service specifications, but also quality 
improvement. LES are locally commissioned depending on the Primary Health Care Organisation’s 
priorities. The establishment of LES was recommended to improve care for specific diseases. For 
example, enhanced services for diabetes could offer a framework within a practice for appropriate 
patients to support self-management and prevent diabetes complications. This includes the 
appropriate use of community diabetes teams and secondary care according to the Clinical 
Commissioning Group’s guidelines and agreed secondary care referral criteria.  
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Evidence of effectiveness 
A recent systematic review (Gillam et al., 2012) of P4P across the UK regions reviewed 94 studies on 
the dimensions of effectiveness, efficiency, equity and patient experience, in line with the Institute of 
Medicine’s definition of quality of care (Institute of Medicine, 2001). Similar to international findings 
by Scott et al. (2011), there were conflicting findings across a large and diverse body of research. 
However, some consistent themes emerged. QOF has assisted in consolidating evidence-based 
methods. It has been associated with an increased rate of improvement of the quality of care in the 
first year of implementation, returning to pre-intervention rates of improvement in subsequent 
years; modest reductions in mortality and hospital admissions in some areas, and where assessed, 
these modest improvements appear cost effective; and it has led to narrowing of differences in 
performance based on deprivation index and strengthened team work (Gillam et al., 2012). 
 
In a high quality interrupted time series study from Kontopantelis et al. (2013), data were derived 
from individual patients registered within a nationally representative sample (N=148) of practices 
between 2000 and 2007. Patient-level data from over 23 000 patients with diabetes were extracted 
using the General Practice Research Database. The specific focus of this study was to investigate 
quality and outcomes of diabetes care associated with 17 incentivised diabetes quality indicators 
pre- and post-implementation. Information about age, gender, length of diagnosis, co-morbid 
conditions and deprivation at the practice level (Index of Multiple Deprivation) were extracted to 
explore their influence on the use of the incentive scheme. In addition, a composite quality of care 
score was calculated for each patient at each time point; and the number of indicators achieved for 
that patient was calculated as a percentage of the number that applied to that patient. These scores 
represent the degree to which each patient received the ‘necessary care’ for their diabetes, as set 
out by the QOF indicators. Results from this study showed that, in the first year of the QOF (2004-
05), there was an improvement in composite recorded QOF care of 14.2 per cent. This was greater 
than expected based on trends in pre-intervention care. However, by the third year (2006-07) the 
difference was smaller, at 7.3 per cent.  
 
The recorded quality of care across the practices increased for all individual indicators, with absolute 
improvements ranging from 4.2 per cent (control of HbA1c levels ≤10%) to 85.5 per cent (providing 
smoking cessation advice). The highest scores were observed for patients with three or more co-
morbid conditions and patients aged over 65 years. Younger patients (aged 17-29 years), and newly 
diagnosed cases had the lowest level of recorded care. Kontopantelis et al. (2013) suggest this is due 
to a higher proportion of type 1 diabetes patients in the younger age groups for whom some quality 
targets are more difficult to achieve; although the authors do not explain why this may be the case. 
Women appear to have received slightly poorer QOF care both before and after the intervention. 
These findings reflect earlier research on P4P, patient characteristics and diabetes management 
(Hamilton et al., 2010). Recorded quality of diabetes care continuously improved over the period of 
the study, against a background of increasing disease prevalence. However, it was already improving 
prior to the introduction of the incentive scheme as measured by the QOF framework. The 
intervention varied with area deprivation, with patients attending practices in more deprived areas 
appearing to have gained the least from the intervention compared with patients in the most 
affluent quartiles (Kontopantelis et al., 2013).  
 
The impact of LES on diabetes outcomes was examined using outcomes data for QOF for diabetes 
targets (blood pressure, lipids and glycaemia) and hospital attendance (Choudhury et al., 2013). Data 
from the Quality Management Analysis System was compared with data extracted from GP patient 
records (GPES) from 76 practices in the Birmingham region. Data pre- and post-LES were compared 
during two separate periods 2004-2005 and 2009-2010. For diabetes-related hospital attendance 
Quality improvement financial incentives for general practitioners - 14 - 
Primary Health Care Research & Information Service 
phcris.org.au 
there was a significant difference for LES practices with fewer patients requiring hospital visits for 
new or follow-up appointments for diabetic patients. There was no significant difference between 
blood pressure (BP) and lipid QOF targets in LES compared to non-LES practices. However, the 
probability of achieving satisfactory glycaemic control increased by almost ten per cent when GPs 
belonged to LES groups. These data were only across two time points so the trajectory of 
effectiveness is unknown. However, this study suggests that financial incentives paired with training 
through LES can improve P4P glycaemic targets but not BP or lipid targets.  
 
Challenges of the UK approach 
The QOF scheme is expensive, costing over £1 billion per year, with ten per cent allocated to diabetes 
care (Kontopantelis et al., 2013). A key criticism of the financial incentives is that practices faced very 
little real risk to their incomes because indicator targets were set at readily achievable levels (Willcox 
et al., 2011). This was reiterated by findings described above (Kontopantelis et al., 2013) that 
identified two factors contributing to the decreases in the second and third years of the incentive 
uptake. Firstly, benchmarking was poor and there was a ceiling effect, whereby some practices’ 
achievement was close to 100 per cent on some indicators. In this context, significant improvements 
were impossible. Secondly, there was a payment threshold and, in the first year, most practices 
exceeded the level of achievement required to secure maximum remuneration, so there was limited 
financial incentive for further improvement. Target measures made allowances for ‘exemptions’ 
when patients failed to respond to calls or attend care clinics (Maynard, 2012). An additional 
explanation may be that the first year ‘improvement’ only reflected better recording and claiming, 
but not necessarily improved provision of care; and that this levelled out in the third year to a more 
regular rate of improvement. The costs of administering the scheme are substantial, and some staff 
have indicated concern at a shift toward a more biomedical focus and less patient-centred focus 
(Gillam et al., 2012). 
 
Strengths of the UK approach 
In regards to the strength of the data, the General Practice Research Database contains complete 
electronic records of patients attending primary care practices in the UK. In addition, practitioners 
used Read Codes, a hierarchical coding rule set, to enter data on their clinical computing systems. 
This potentially improved the quality of the data. Furthermore, practitioners were not limited to 
Read Codes in order to counteract possible underestimates of the true prevalence due to changes in 
coding behaviour following the introduction of the scheme and subsequent changes in QOF business 
rules (Kontopantelis et al., 2013). The QOF relied on a large investment in information technology (IT) 
which is likely to have contributed to the increase in recorded levels of care. The uniform investment 
in IT across the whole of primary care may not have taken place in the absence of the scheme. 
Kontopantelis et al. (2013) suggest that even if the IT investment existed beforehand, it is doubtful 
the GPs would have chosen to adapt to the new system altogether as they have, if not rewarded to 
do so. 
 
The calculating quality reporting service (CQRS) replaced the manual systems for calculating and 
reporting quality outcomes for many general practice services. It has been suggested that the 
enhanced service approach is that practice achievement data can be obtained from general practice 
clinical systems via the General Practice Extraction Service (GPES). CQRS is more efficient and cost-
effective as it automates the returns process, saving time and resources. 
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United States 
Quality improvement approach 
In the US, P4P is the principal approach to improving quality of care; in 2007, there were an 
estimated 256 different P4P programs across the country, most of which were operating in primary 
care settings (Eijkenaar, 2012). For example, almost half of the Health Maintenance Organizations 
distributed across the country use some form of P4P to incentivise practice among their physicians 
(Bishop et al., 2012) and a number of health plans have P4P incentives attached. Clinical quality is the 
aspect of care most commonly incentivised by these programs and process and structural measures 
are more common than outcome measures. Often US incentives target groups, with requirements 
that a minimum number of patients be attributed to an individual provider. Over 60 per cent of the 
programs only use bonuses, with ten to 20 per cent using withholding approaches. Despite an 
increase in ongoing payments (i.e. multiple payments as services are provided throughout the year), 
the majority of programs pay one annual payment for all services provided; and estimated average 
payment size is approximately seven per cent of total revenue for physicians. Fifty per cent of 
programs use relative targets though there are increasing numbers of programs focusing on absolute 
targets and performance (Eijkenaar, 2012). The other main incentive used to promote high quality 
care is public reporting of quality measures (Bishop et al., 2012). Public reporting refers to data being 
made publicly available about health care structures, processes and outcomes at individual or 
organisational levels, for the purpose of comparing data across providers or comparisons with 
national and regional level standards (Totten et al., 2012). 
 
Incentive schemes for quality improvement 
In 2007, the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative was introduced (now termed the Physician Quality 
Reporting System), a voluntary ‘pay for reporting’ model in which family physicians provide care to 
Medicare beneficiaries and report their performance on predefined quality measures (American 
Academy of Family Physicians, 2014). Physicians were entitled to a lump-sum incentive payment if 
they met the criteria for submitting quality data based on a list of 74 individual quality measures 
(American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons, online). In 2010, the Affordable Care Act extended 
this model making quality reporting mandatory. Incentives are used to reward practices that meet 
criteria associated with better outcomes such as increased continuity of care or ease of access. 
Physicians are eligible for an incentive payment of one per cent of their Medicare Part B Physician 
Fee Schedule for successfully reporting Physician Quality Reporting System measures, of which there 
are currently 190 measures and 14 measure groups. There are additional opportunities for a further 
0.5 per cent incentive if physicians participate in maintenance of certification programs (more often 
than is needed to maintain their board status) and complete qualified maintenance of certification 
program assessments. With both the Affordable Care Act and the more recent Patient-Centered 
Medical Home model (which adopts the same reporting model), compensation is designed to enable 
practitioners to demonstrate the quality of care they are providing (Bishop et al., 2012). 
 
Examples of specific types of US financial incentives can be understood by examining EHRs. The 2009 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Act saw the commitment of US$27 billion 
over six years from the Government to incentivise EHRs across a range of health professionals in 
different settings (e.g. primary care, hospitals, school dental clinics) (Kalenderian et al., 2013). The 
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act also encouraged adoption of EHRs through incentives 
(Ryan et al., 2013); and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) provide incentives for 
transition to, adoption of, and meaningful use of EHRs to improve patient care (CMS, 2012a, Jacob, 
2013). More details on meaningful use of EHR technology in the US is provided in the Appendix (p 
35). Table 3 (Appendix) illustrates examples of meaningful use of EHR technology to:  
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• improve quality, safety, efficiency and reduce health disparities 
• engage individuals/families in health care 
• improve coordination of care 
• improve population and public health 
• maintain privacy and security (CMS, 2014).  
These incentives include not only a reward for switching to EHRs and meaningful use of EHRs, but 
also a deduction to payments if practices do not switch to the electronic systems.  
 
Evidence of effectiveness 
A quality improvement intervention study from New York recruited small primary care clinics to 
investigate the impact of P4P incentives using a good quality cluster-randomised trial (Bardach et al., 
2013). Clinics were paid for each patient whose care met the performance criteria with higher 
payments received for patients who had comorbidities, Medicaid insurance, or were uninsured 
(maximum payments US$200 per patient or US$100 000 per clinic). Outcomes assessed included 
aspirin or antithrombotic prescription, BP control, cholesterol control, and smoking cessation. Clinics 
that received the intervention reported significant absolute improvements in rates of appropriate 
antithrombotic prescription, BP control, and smoking cessation. For example, 17.1 per cent of clinics 
administered smoking cessation interventions at baseline with a significant increase to 29.5 per cent 
providing this type of care after introducing the P4P incentives (compared to 19.1% to 26.8% for 
control clinics). In regards to cardiovascular care processes, this P4P incentive program was able to 
improve quality in comparison to usual care practices in small EHR-enabled clinics. 
 
Also aiming to assess the impact of a P4P incentive, a quasi-experimental study from Washington 
investigated a P4P incentive as part of a population-focused, integrated care program for depressed 
adults in community health clinics (Unützer et al., 2012). The Mental Health Integration Program, 
provided in over 100 community health clinics and 30 community mental health centres, illustrated 
variable quality and outcomes across sites; thus the program sponsors introduced the P4P incentive 
to improve consistency. The nature of this incentive meant that a quarter of the annual program 
funding to individual clinics was contingent on meeting quality indicators, including timely follow-up 
with patients, psychiatric consultation for patients not showing clinical improvement, and tracking of 
medications. Regular feedback and assistance was provided to participants in relation to these 
quality indicators. Following the introduction of the P4P program, results indicated that patients 
were more likely to be offered psychiatric consultation if required, and more likely to experience 
improvements in depression severity, timely follow-up, and a reduction in time to improvement. 
 
The EHR incentives were designed for providers to demonstrate that they are using EHRs to improve 
the care provided to their patients. According to the CMS, at November 2013, more than 334 000 
health care providers had received payment for participating in the EHR incentive programs. The 
majority of the Medicare eligible professionals (EPs) in this group were doctors of medicine or 
osteopathy (N=289 852) and similarly it was physicians who represented the majority of the 
Medicaid EPs (N=95 627) (CMS, 2013c). Data illustrated that approximately 81 per cent of all EPs had 
registered to participate in the incentive programs (CMS, 2013b), with 54 per cent participating in 
the Medicare program and 27 per cent in the Medicaid program. Twenty per cent of Medicare EPs 
were based in family practice, and 71 per cent of Medicaid payments were received by physicians, 
with 17 per cent received by nurse practitioners. Approximately 64 per cent of all EPs received an 
incentive payment for meaningful use or adoption, implementation, or upgrade of EHRs. The most 
frequently achieved core objectives referred to provision of an electronic copy of health information 
and the active medication list (Table 4, Appendix). Data illustrated an increase in the percentage of 
EPs successfully performing core objectives over the period from 2011-2013. In relation to menu 
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objectives, clinical lab test results and transition of care summaries were the most successfully 
performed, with trends for improvements across most objectives over the three year period. This 
suggests that the incentives improved the use of EHRs and influenced the quality of care provided to 
patients. 
 
Challenges of the US approach 
There are challenges in applying P4P in low SES areas or with vulnerable populations (Chien et al., 
2012). In these areas and for some other practices, quality targets may be perceived as unattainable. 
In addition, the practices may not have the resources or infrastructure to identify or follow-up 
patients. One recent study (Dowd et al., 2013) investigated the effect of a health plan’s P4P scheme 
on prescription rates. The incentive was based on the performance of participating physician 
practices in an entire established network but the network implemented rewards at the practice 
level on an all-or-nothing basis (i.e. if the prescription targets were met). The authors described how 
this was a strong incentive for individual practices but also noted that, when incentives are for 
absolute improvement, those practices performing well under the target may give up and 
inadvertently prevent the network from being rewarded. 
 
Challenges relate to both patient adherence and physician perceptions (Chien et al., 2012). It has 
been proposed that incentives may not be accepted if they are not sufficient to significantly affect 
physician incomes or patients’ quality perceptions and that some physicians may not agree with the 
indicators selected to measure quality (Bishop et al., 2012). Subsequently, the incentive amount and 
support available may not be sufficient to induce desired physician behavioural changes in some 
cases (Chien et al., 2012). Additional challenges to quality improvement data relate to the population 
size. That is, it is hard to measure improvement if the incentive relates to a disease or condition for 
which the sample of eligible visits is too small (e.g. in rural/remote areas).  
 
Strengths of the US approach 
Some of the benefits of the US approach to quality improvement include the widespread uptake of 
initiatives. Public reporting on quality of care is mandated and linked to financial incentives. P4P 
incentives are frequently implemented across the country and act to improve consistency of practice 
and encourage high quality care provision for patients. In many cases, the emphasis is on awarding 
bonuses rather than withholding payments which acts to engage physicians in making positive 
behaviour changes. 
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Canada 
Quality improvement approach 
The 2004-2014 10 Year Plan to Strengthen Health Care from the Canadian Federal Government has 
allocated funds “to support innovation and stimulate system-wide improvements in quality” (The 
Commonwealth Fund, 2012, p 22) around aspects of care such as wait times, health technologies and 
patient safety. The Health Council of Canada is responsible for monitoring progress in improving the 
quality of the health system, however, as many quality improvement initiatives occur at the 
provincial and territorial levels they are also monitored at a local level by councils specifically 
established to conduct public reporting on health system performance. Financial incentives have 
been introduced to support after-hours care and encourage participation in multi-professional 
practices (The Commonwealth Fund, 2012).  
 
Incentive schemes for quality improvement 
Ontario originally introduced P4P incentives in 1999 to address preventive care and services provided 
by family physicians, with further expansion to the incentives in the Physician Services Agreement of 
2004 (Hurley et al., 2011). Performance incentives were available to a subset of physicians, those 
working in Ontario’s primary care reform practices. The incentives specify a target population, time 
period and threshold coverage levels. In 2006, British Columbia and Manitoba introduced P4P 
approaches termed the Full Service Family Practice Incentive Program and the Quality Based 
Incentive Funding Program, respectively (Hurley et al., 2011). The former involves initiatives which 
address financial incentives relating to high quality management of congestive heart failure, diabetes 
and hypertension; obstetric and maternity care; reviews of patients in care facilities; community-
based patient care; patients with comorbidities; cardiovascular risk assessment; group practices; 
mental health care; palliative care; acute care discharge to community care; and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (British Columbia Ministry of Health, n.d.). The latter, the Quality Based Incentive 
Funding Program, is a blended physician compensation approach which considers the quality of 
services provided using P4P and the volume of services provided by the FFS clinics participating in the 
Manitoba Physician Integrated Network; and rewards process rather than outcomes (Manitoba 
Health, n.d.). In 2009, Alberta developed the Performance and Diligence Indicators Program which 
ran from 2010-2011 and was designed to reward individual family physicians who met “specific 
performance and/or diligence indicators that deliver substantive clinical value” (p 3). The first phase 
involved the development of validated lists of patients for whom the physician was actively serving 
as their most responsible primary care physician. Physicians were compensated after both physician 
validation of the list ($3.50 per patient) and patient validation of patient-physician relationship (an 
additional $3.50 per patient) (Government of Alberta, 2010). The second phase aimed to address 
performance indicators but was not implemented (Primary Care Initiative, 2013).  
 
Evidence of effectiveness 
The Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis in Ontario undertook an evaluation of the effect 
of performance incentives on service provision using a pre-/post-design with data from 1998-99 and 
2007-8 (Hurley et al., 2011). Measures addressed incentives for 11 services: senior flu shots, toddler 
immunisations; cervical, breast and colorectal cancer screening (preventive services); obstetric, 
hospital and palliative care services; office procedures; prenatal care; and home visits (annual special 
payments for physician services). Preventive services payments include two parts that reward 
practices for: first, contacting patients and scheduling appointments for preventive services ($6.86 
contact payment for each eligible patient); and second, achieving high rates of coverage for the 
service in the target populations (cumulative preventive care bonus payment – practice rewarded 
when one physician achieves specified levels of coverage, amount relates to service coverage and 
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depends on type of practice as to whether funds go directly to physician or stay with practice). 
Special payments for physician services are bonuses paid to physicians, based on whether they reach 
a minimum absolute level of service provision where the minimum is defined in terms of number of 
services, dollar value of services, number of patients or a combination, and there is a single threshold 
level. The evaluation also assessed whether provision of 57 services, funded by capitation payment, 
changed over time among family physicians enrolled in Family Health Networks. Participating 
physicians were from different primary care reform practice types (Table 5, Appendix) including 
Family Health Networks, Family Health Groups, Comprehensive Care Models and Family Health 
Organizations and were compared with ineligible family physicians (i.e. those not working in primary 
care reform practices) who had traditional FFS practices. In developing the data, “the measure of 
utilization for each of the preventive care bonuses was the proportion of a physician’s eligible 
patients who had received the preventive service during the relevant time period… the measure of 
utilization for the special payments was an indicator of whether a physician’s pattern of service 
provision exceeded the level required to qualify for the special payment” (p v).  
 
Results from Hurley et al.’s (2011) evaluation illustrated that the provision of incentives increased the 
provision of all of senior flu shots (5.1%), pap smears (7.0%), mammograms (2.8%) and colorectal 
cancer screening (56.7%). Trends suggested that while practice size had little impact, there was a 
greater response among younger physicians and those who recorded lower baseline levels of 
provision. There were no significant improvements in the physician services based on incentives 
(special payments). There were also no differences in the provision of services when comparing 
those funded by capitation and those not funded by capitation. The authors describe how the 
preventive services measured are acknowledged to represent high quality care while the incentivised 
physician services were linked to professional practice more so than quality.  
 
A further study from Ontario assessed the influence of a diabetes incentive code for primary care 
physicians (Kiran et al., 2012). One quarter of Ontarians with diabetes had an incentive code billed by 
their physicians and the longitudinal results found that introduction of the incentive led to minimal 
improvement in quality of care at both the patient and population levels. The findings illustrated that 
those physicians who had been providing the highest quality care before the incentives were 
introduced were those most likely to claim incentive payments and that physicians working in 
practices reimbursed by blended capitation were 25 per cent more likely to bill an incentive than 
physicians working within a FFS practice.  
 
Research from Alberta explored quality improvement interventions for increasing the rates of 
vaccinations among community-dwelling adults (Lau et al., 2012). The study explored a range of 
interventions including audit and feedback, case management, clinician education and reminders, 
financial incentives, patient outreach and team changes. Results illustrated that both patient (i.e. 
eliminating out-of-pocket costs) and clinician financial incentives were effective for significantly 
increasing influenza vaccinations.  
 
Challenges of the Canadian approach 
Low uptake of an incentive may relate to its economic value, physicians’ awareness of the incentive’s 
availability, administrative burden and resources available to support incentive roll out (Kiran et al., 
2012). Perceptions of incentivised physician services in Ontario did not relate to quality and often the 
incentivised actions required additional infrastructure or equipment, hence potentially limiting 
uptake (Hurley et al., 2011). This reflects a situation where much of Canada continues to rely on FFS 
payment methods (Hutchison et al., 2011). 
 
Quality improvement financial incentives for general practitioners - 20 - 
Primary Health Care Research & Information Service 
phcris.org.au 
Strengths of the Canadian approach 
Preventive services in the Ontario study were activities commonly conducted by physicians and 
required no additional equipment or resources (Hurley et al., 2011). In many cases, they were 
complementary to other services. For example, the authors of the evaluation described how the 
software for many EHR systems being adopted by physicians enabled automatic reminders for 
preventive services. Further, these preventive services incentives also included two parts: contacting 
patients and outcomes – perhaps this encourages practice teamwork and allows the targets to be 
reached more effectively.  
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New Zealand  
Quality improvement approach 
The NZ Government has been attempting to improve quality in the health care system since 2003 
(Gauld et al., 2012). Prior to 2010, the Quality Improvement Committee (QIC) oversaw quality 
improvement initiatives in NZ, including a series of pilot quality improvement projects in public 
hospitals. In 2010, the QIC was replaced by the Health Quality and Safety Commission, a stand-alone 
Crown agent, which was established to lead a national quality program including development of a 
set of national indicators for hospitals (Gauld et al., 2012).  
 
However, there is little mention of primary care’s role in quality improvement initiatives and a 
number of challenges have been identified. According to Gauld et al. (2012), quality improvement 
initiatives have been “piecemeal and insufficient”, and “mostly left to individual hospitals and 
districts, with little national coordination” (p 829). While GPs have been using EHRs and other IT 
applications (electronic prescriptions, test ordering) since the 1990s, Gauld et al.’s report suggests 
that there has been an overall lack of leadership or coordination at the level of government; and 
limited interoperability between hospitals and the primary care sector. The National Health IT Board, 
which was established in 2009, aims to develop national solutions to some of the IT problems and 
facilitate shared EHRs in 2014.  
 
Incentive schemes for quality improvement 
While capitation funding is widespread in NZ, additional funds are available for chronic disease 
management, strategies to improve patient access and health promotion. However, these bonuses 
are paid to primary health organisations (PHOs) rather than practices or GPs (Gauld et al., 2012), and 
provide only a small proportion of PHOs’ income (Buetow, 2008). The Primary Health Organisation 
Performance Management Programme (PHOPMP), also known as the PHO Performance Programme, 
which commenced on 1 January 2006, is a joint initiative between district health boards (DHBs) and 
the Ministry of Health (Buetow, 2008, DHB Shared Services, 2006). This programme aims to 
encourage and reward performance by PHOs in line with evidence-based guidelines, and measure 
and reward progress in reducing health inequalities by including a focus on high needs populations. 
Performance indicators are specific to the locality, but target ‘high needs’ patients with poorer 
health. In addition to PHO review and feedback and expenditure benchmarks, P4P against 
performance indicators are a core component of the program and are underpinned by the principles 
of quality, equity and affordability (Buetow, 2008).  
 
The NZ Government is currently considering a new performance framework for the health care 
system. In late 2013, the Health Improvement & Innovation Research Centre (HIIRC) circulated a 
draft framework, the Integrated Performance and Incentive Framework: Achieving the Best Health 
Care Performance for New Zealand (HIIRC, 2013) which proposes that primarily non-financial 
incentives will be used. 
The proposed framework would not rely upon direct financial incentives for performance 
improvement… Limited direct funding available for incentives, that will be spent so as to get a 
balance between capacity building and incentives for results. Incentive funding will generally 
cascade down to the front line service providers. (HIIRC, 2013, p 4). 
 
The non-financial incentives that have been proposed are: 
• Influence: within district alliances, high performing primary care organisations will have the 
opportunity to influence decisions pertaining to the use of resources 
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• Freedom to exercise professional judgement: using a “tight-loose-tight approach”, and within 
nationally determined performance indicators, high performing organisations will have greater 
autonomy and professional freedom to determine priorities and performance measures 
• Supporting strong clinical governance: within district health systems, performance 
improvement resources may be used in clinical governance to strengthen clinical practice 
(HIIRC, 2013, pp 4-5). 
 
Evidence of effectiveness 
Little evidence of effectiveness of existing financial incentives for quality improvement in primary 
care was located in the available literature.  
 
An evaluation of the PHOPMP began in 2006 (Buetow, 2008) and findings of a survey of managers of 
the first 29 participating PHOs were positive: 
All stated that, as a result of the PHO performance management programme, their PHO had 
developed an increased focus on quality improvement, including clinical facilitation; data 
collection, data quality and feedback to member practitioners; and clinical governance 
groups (Buetow, 2008, p 42). 
 
Investigating quality activities undertaken by general practices, Perera et al. (2013) found that 72.9 
per cent of practices that had undertaken quality activity in the previous two years (prior to mid-late 
2009) had participated in the PHOPMP some of the time, and 14.8 per cent most of the time (Perera 
et al., 2013). Perera et al. (2013) found that financial incentives would motivate increased primary 
care professionals’ activity in more than 40 per cent of respondents (response rate in this study was 
very low). 
 
Performance results for the Te Tai Tokerau region on the PHO Performance Programme were 
published in June 2013, suggesting despite lack of peer-reviewed publications that the programme is 
still underway in some regions. Indicators included in this report included breast and cervical cancer 
screening, ischaemic cardiovascular disease detection, cardiovascular disease risk assessment, 
diabetes detection, diabetes follow-up after detection, vaccination coverage (3 indicators), smoking 
status and smoking brief advice and cessation support. The report identifies the PHOs’ performance 
in the context of DHB and national performance. Payments are made every six months for most 
indicators. Payments for the majority of indicators are made on the basis of percentage attainment 
of the target. The maximum available payment is NZ$6 (GST inclusive) per enrolled member, if all 
targets are achieved. However, this report does not specify payments received by this PHO. In 
addition, the PHO Performance Programme guideline specifies that PHOs are eligible to receive 
payments as they improve their performance on indicators against targets. For the majority of 
indicators, the closer the PHO moves towards its target, the greater the proportion of the payment 
received. Some indicators are provided for information only. 
 
Challenges of the NZ approach 
This review has highlighted that one of the biggest challenges facing quality improvement and 
financial incentive approaches in NZ is the lack of evaluation literature. The one quality improvement 
program with financial incentives identified in the literature search has limited evidence which was 
published in 2008. In a series of interviews and surveys, Perera et al. (2013) reported that primary 
care professionals often perceive quality improvement activities as being of little relevance to day-to-
day clinical care. In light of this, Buetow (2008) and colleagues highlight challenges across the world 
around financially incentivising quality improvement and identified a number of challenges and 
criticisms specific to the PHOPMP, including:  
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• small size of the monetary compensation may be “ineffective as an extrinsic motivator and 
reward for achievement and improvement” (p 42) 
• financial incentives ignore intrinsic motivators, such as pride and professional competence and 
autonomy 
• bonuses are paid to PHOs to improve services, rather than supplement providers’ incomes, yet 
it is the provider’s responsibility to deliver the quality care 
• the PHOPMP focuses on high needs populations and scarce public resources may be diverted 
away from other priority health care issues 
• considerable lack of transparency, clarity and guidance about how PHOs may use performance 
payments, which is linked to a perception of unfairness pertaining to the approval process. 
 
Strengths of the NZ approach 
There are performance results published for PHOs on PHOPMP indicators allowing for comparison 
across local, regional and national populations with high needs. However, there is no formal 
evaluation of the program as a whole. 
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Summary  
Evidence from a systematic literature review (Scott et al., 2011) indicated that different financial 
incentive interventions show modest and variable effects on the quality of health care provided by 
GPs. More recently, evidence suggests that P4P programs have limited impact on quality 
improvement (Kontopantelis et al., 2013).  
 
It is important to acknowledge the five key points that are relevant to financial incentives (Appleby et 
al., 2012): 
1 Payment systems cannot do everything: they should be evaluated together with other policy 
levers for quality improvement; or in terms of their additional impact, controlling for the effect 
of other approaches 
2 One size does not fit all: different payment systems may be needed for different types of 
services, depending on whether more or less activity is desirable; and whether there is capacity 
to meet varying levels of demand 
3 Payment systems need to be flexible: changing objectives, different contexts and the 
experience of impact may require adjustments to a payment system 
4 Trade-offs between objectives is inevitable: potential conflicts may arise between cost and 
quality or supply maintenance, particularly where the quality of services for the cost is not 
sustainable or where the number of objectives increases 
5 Data and research for payment systems must be strengthened: high quality data and analysis is 
needed to inform the structure of payment systems and avoid unintended effects.  
 
Challenges 
Who gets paid? 
Ultimately the system of financial incentives associated with the quality of care that professionals are 
expected to provide affects how these professionals feel and behave. Two main problems associated 
with who receives a financial incentive were identified in the literature: one relates to the target for 
change; and the other relates to performance evaluation. 
1 There is a consistent lack of information about distribution of payments; and in the available 
information, there is a range of different systems with some incentives directed at groups or 
organisations and others directed at individuals. This is a key consideration in designing future 
programs. Given that team-based care is a central part of PHC, it is important to determine 
whether it is best to reward the primary outcome measure based solely on the behaviour of 
one physician or whether it is possible to take into account the likelihood that tasks may be 
delegated to others (e.g. practice, nurse, practice managers etc.) (Scott et al., 2011).  
2 Evaluating the effectiveness of incentives is difficult when the unit of analysis for quality 
improvement differs. In some studies, it is an individual physician, and others refer to a practice 
or an episode of care. Further, in some cases where there has been national roll out of 
incentives, such as in the UK, it is hard to determine the impact of the incentive as there is no 
concurrent control group for comparison purposes (Hurley et al., 2011).  
 
How much is enough? 
The strength of financial incentives is often not well reported (i.e. what proportion of annual revenue 
is delivered by incentives) (Scott et al., 2011). Internationally, the proportion of providers’ income 
that is derived from incentives varies substantially. For example, in the US incentives may contribute 
seven per cent of total revenue while under the QOF in the UK payments can contribute up to 30 per 
cent (Eijkenaar, 2012). If the incentive is too low, it is unlikely to motivate behaviour change and/or 
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the administrative burden related to claiming a minimal reward may not be worthwhile. Incentives 
are not accepted if they are perceived as insufficient to affect physician income; fail to influence 
patients’ quality perceptions; or offer inadequate measures of quality in the physicians’ view. If the 
incentive is too high, the costs to the health system increase and perverse incentives may prevail. In 
addition, reports on the degree of attachment between patient and GP are often lacking. That is, if a 
patient visits multiple health professionals, then effect sizes in measures of outcomes representing 
quality improvement may be partially attributable to other physicians, yet the reward is attached to 
only one practice (Rosenthal et al., 2006). Further, data often reflect the effect of an incentive on the 
provision of services, yet it is rarely translated to consider the impact on health outcomes at patient 
and population levels (Hurley et al., 2011).  
 
What are the unintended consequences? 
In their systematic review, Scott et al. (2011) reported that the unintended consequences of 
incentives are rarely examined. These consequences include: 
• perverse behaviours such as crowding in/out, exception rates, and gaming, where practices 
exaggerate performance or maximise exemption quotas (Maynard, 2012) in relation to 
incentives; or worse, coercive behaviour by GPs towards patients considered as non-compliant 
(Gillam et al., 2012) 
• diverting attention from aspects of care not targeted by incentives 
• causing conflict within workplaces by directing incentives at GPs and overlooking the notion 
that whole practice teams may have helped support patients and practitioners (Hurley et al., 
2011, Scott et al., 2011).  
 
Incentives targeted without consideration for the context may in fact be a disincentive. For example, 
in small practices, or in rural/remote areas, where staffing and resources are minimal, the incentive 
targets may be too difficult to achieve and the administrative burden of making claims for funds may 
be a disincentive (Australian National Audit Office, 2010). Similarly, financial incentives in the UK 
showed the least advantage in areas of greatest deprivation compared to the more affluent quartiles 
(Kontopantelis et al., 2013). Little response can be expected if the target is perceived unattainable or 
if the target is already attained - this is known as the goal-gradient hypothesis (Heath et al., 1999). 
 
Developing an evidence-base? 
P4P is dominating policy agendas worldwide. The evidence of effectiveness of financial incentives to 
inform the implementation of payment systems are often poorly designed, implemented and 
evaluated (Maynard, 2012). As a result, there are shortcomings in the available literature that 
increase the potential for bias and reduce the likelihood that similar results would be replicated 
(Scott et al., 2011). There are several limitations to the evidence available on quality improvement 
and financial incentives: 
• strong theory is needed to underpin examination of both intended and unintended 
consequences (e.g. motivation theory, cognitive psychology). 
• study design needs improvement: in particular, there is currently limited external validity, 
inadequate blinding, and potential bias in selection of participants (towards those that perform 
well), financial interventions to reward performance are often implemented universally, as part 
of policy reform, therefore there is no control group for comparison. When a program is 
applied uniformly to a large number of providers, absolute targets may not be efficient because 
payments are made for performance already being delivered. 
• meaningful measures of quality are needed to ensure the indicator or outcomes rewarded. 
Recorded quality of care does not necessarily mean actual improvement in the quality of care 
experienced by a patient. Incentivised measures of performance are not necessarily ones that 
Quality improvement financial incentives for general practitioners - 26 - 
Primary Health Care Research & Information Service 
phcris.org.au 
patients value or would be willing to pay for. Quality indicators that are “selected for their ease 
and cost of measurement” may discourage innovation in quality improvement (Buetow, 2008). 
To remedy this, a broad range of outcomes (structural, process, outcome) and validated 
measures need to be utilised. This may relate to batching or grouping clinical indicators in a 
meaningful way; understanding normal variation in data; using benchmarking; providing 
resources and infrastructure to enable accurate and consistent reporting of data by practices; 
or verifying reports by using prevalence trends reported in previous studies (Coombs et al., 
2011, Dawda et al., 2010, Kontopantelis et al., 2013). For example, Figure 1 illustrates the 
bundle approach to performance data for type 2 diabetes care. Instead of using multiple single 
measures, which range from 60 per cent (for HbA1c) to 73 per cent for cholesterol, a set of 
related measures are bundled to drive improvement in the quality of care for a condition. In 
this case, 36 per cent of patients receive three QOF items (Dawda et al., 2010). Further, 
unintended consequences of incentives for quality improvement should be measured (Scott et 
al., 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Dawda et al., 2010). DM=Diabetes Mellitus; BP=blood pressure; Chol=cholesterol 
Figure 1 Use of the bundle approach for measure performance in diabetes care 
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• Use of data to influence successful quality improvement in the future. For example, 
benchmarking against predetermined standards is the most common means of providing 
feedback for general practices about their quality of care. However, it is difficult to draw 
inferences about inter-practice differences without controlling for potentially confounding 
factors that exert a strong influence on a wide range of process and outcome indicators (e.g. 
age, deprivation index, disease prevalence) (Coombs et al., 2011). The clarity of data must also 
be considered. For example, many studies fail to distinguish between types of diabetes 
incentivised (Greene, 2013, Kontopantelis et al., 2013). It is possible that type 1 diabetes may 
be managed by specialists, whereas type 2 diabetes may be the domain of PHC practitioners. 
Thus, where it may seem that GPs are not performing the desired incentivised behaviours for 
diabetes care, it may be that the specialist has already ordered the required tests; and future 
research should highlight these differences in practices for different conditions. In addition, 
while substantial literature and data are available on diabetes, future directions should 
examine different conditions and incentivised health concerns.  
• Improved reporting of interventions is needed, including details of the type of payment 
scheme used (baseline and control), use and distribution of payments; size of payments as a 
proportion of total revenue and relative costs and cost-effectiveness of financial incentives 
compared to other behaviour change strategies to improve quality. 
 
Absolute versus relative improvement?  
In this review, an important finding was that the literature pertaining to quality improvement and 
financial incentive initiatives rarely identified whether they were reporting absolute or relative 
improvement in quality of care measures. To reiterate, improvements in quality of care (i.e. patient 
care, drug effectiveness, patient status and other key metrics) can be measured in relative or 
absolute terms. Absolute improvement is defined as the change in performance from baseline to 
follow-up; relative improvement is defined as the absolute improvement divided by the difference 
between the baseline performance and perfect performance (100%) (Jencks et al., 2003). This 
distinction is crucial as, in some cases, absolute and relative measures may diverge with respect to 
the magnitude or direction of change leading to fundamentally different conclusions. Methodological 
overviews of measuring and monitoring health inequalities recommend reporting both absolute and 
relative measures whenever possible (King et al., 2012). The manner of presentation of results can 
influence PHC stakeholders’ decisions about incentives.  
 
Benchmarking or setting performance outcomes also has absolute and relative considerations. Some 
of the UK QOF indicators showed a large ceiling effect, whereby practices were already achieving 
very high levels; thus further improvement was unlikely (Kontopantelis et al., 2013). However, the 
worst performers at baseline had the potential to gain greater rewards. Internationally, the highest 
performing practices often illustrated the greatest uptake of incentives, rather than those whose 
performance would have benefited most from improvements in quality. Eijkenaar (2012) reported 
that absolute targets are likely to be more effective than relative targets because they are 
transparent and create less uncertainty regarding the efforts required to become eligible for 
payment. Relative targets may reduce collaboration and dissemination of best practices because 
they encourage competition. Adopting a tiered series of targets or differentiating targets based on 
baseline performance (with payment size conditional on level of attainment) could resolve this issue. 
“Piece-rate” payment approaches for each appropriately managed patient were also suggested 
(Chien et al., 2010).  
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Conclusions 
Any evaluation of financial incentives associated with quality improvement must balance a nuanced 
assessment of health outcomes and other gains against costs. These are often difficult to describe, 
let alone quantify. The current review is consistent with these findings, showing mixed results in 
relation to the benefits of P4P and financial incentives on practitioner behaviours, and identifying a 
number of challenges to both implementing and measuring quality improvement in PHC.  
 
Future directions 
A number of potential strategies, funding models and incentives for quality improvement in PHC 
have been identified, including:  
• Considering the benefit of enrolled populations 
• Leveraging GPs’ competitive nature by introducing reports on clinics’ and colleagues’ 
performances 
• Encouraging multilayered approaches to improving the quality of care (local, regional and 
national) 
• Developing regulations and new governance strategies 
• Performance targets aligned with professional standards 
• Making quality improvement implicit to the culture of organisations 
• Conducting educational and public information campaigns 
• Introducing non-financial incentives 
• Focusing on professional norms and behaviours 
• Changing roles in the health workforce 
• Strengthening consumer engagement and participation in this age of patient-centred practices 
(Greene, 2013, Willcox et al., 2011).  
 
Different examples from across the globe have illustrated mixed levels of improvement following the 
introduction of incentives. Moreover, individuals who are rewarded tend to be those who are 
already offering high quality care prior to the incentives being implemented (Rosenthal et al., 2005). 
Future programs may need to focus on practices that are not providing high quality baseline care and 
specifically target their processes. Further, lessons may be gleaned from hospitals, many of which 
also use P4P to drive change and focus on quality improvement in their processes. For example, in 
the US, changing the Medicare and Premier Inc. Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration from 
rewarding only high performance to rewarding high performance, moderate performance and 
improvement “reduced the disparity in the receipt of any incentive payment and for incentive 
payments per discharge between hospitals caring for the most and least socioeconomically 
disadvantaged patient populations” (Ryan et al., 2012, p 1419). 
 
P4P programs should be as automated as possible to ensure that claiming the payment is not 
burdensome, which may deter participation (Greene, 2013). In addition, incentives’ absolute size and 
relative size need to be sufficiently large to motivate GPs to change their behaviours, but not so large 
as to compromise the budget on rewarding behaviour that is achieved with minimal effort. With 
evidence that positive reinforcement has more lasting effects than punishment, further examination 
of the impact of withholding funds versus rewarding behaviours should be considered. There also 
needs to be greater consistency in rewarding either practices or practitioners. With the shift towards 
multidisciplinary teamwork and integrated care, it seems that directing incentives at groups may 
represent a key direction for the future. However, if the focus remains on individual practitioners, 
while there needs to be investment in structures and processes to support quality improvement, the 
drive for quality improvement should tap into intrinsic motivation rather than extrinsic motivation; 
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and future interventions could target the cognitions of individuals in PHC (Dawda, personal 
communication, 2013). 
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Appendices 
 
United States 
 
US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services EHR Incentive Program 
 
The information below relates to details around meaningful use of EHR technology for eligible 
professionals (EP); requirements differ for eligible hospitals/critical access hospitals (CMS, 2010). 
 
There are three components of ‘meaningful use’: 
1. Use of EHR in a meaningful manner (e.g. e-prescribing) 
2. Use of EHR technology for electronic exchange of health information to improve quality of care 
3. Use of EHR technology to submit measures including clinical quality measures and the like. 
 
• Stage 1 – to qualify for an incentive payment, 20 of the 24 objectives (see Table 1 below) must be 
met (i.e. 15 core set, 5 menu set) in a 90 day period in the first (calendar) year of meaningful use 
and in a full year in the second year of meaningful use. To meet certain objectives 80 per cent of 
patients must have records in the certified EHR technology. Five of 10 menu objectives may be 
deferred. 
 
• Stage 2 – to qualify, 17 core objectives and 3 menu objectives must be met (see Table 1 below). 
Requirements must be met for two full years. 
 
• In Stage 1 eligible professionals must also report on 6 total clinical quality measures (CQMs, see 
Table 2) (3 required core measures or 3 alternate core measures) and 3 additional measures 
(selected from a set of 38 clinical quality measures). For Stage 2 in 2014 it will be 9 of 64 CQMs 
(measures unavailable at time of writing). 
 
Two types of percentage-based measures are used in demonstrating meaningful use: 
1. Denominator is all patients seen during the EHR reporting period (regardless of whether their 
records are kept using EHR technology) 
2. Denominator is actions or subsets of patients seen during the reporting period (only includes 
patients or actions taken on behalf of those patients, whose records are kept using EHR technology). 
 
Objectives are not applicable to every practice, hence physicians who do not perform that activity 
would be excluded from having to meet that measure and it would not count towards their 5 
deferred objectives.  
 
If physicians work at multiple locations but do not have the technology available at all practices, 50 
per cent of their total patient encounters would need to occur at locations where certified EHR 
technology is available and they would base all meaningful use measures only on encounters that 
occurred at the locations where the technology is available. 
 
EPs may choose whether they participate in the Medicare or Medicaid program: 
• Medicare program (for EPs that demonstrate meaningful use): implemented by federal 
government; reductions in payments for providers that do not demonstrate meaningful use; 
meaningful use must be demonstrated in year 1; maximum incentive is $44 000 over 5 
consecutive years for EPs; available to physicians (e.g. doctors of medicine, osteopathy, dental 
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surgery/medicine, podiatry, optometry, chiropractors); with an additional incentive for 
professionals who provide services in a designated health professional shortage area. 
• Medicaid program (for EPs that adopt, implement, upgrade or demonstrate meaningful use): 
voluntary for States to implement; no Medicaid payment reductions; 
adopted/implemented/upgraded option for first participation year (where adopted means 
acquired and installed; implemented means commenced utilisation or and upgraded means 
expanded) and demonstration of meaningful use for up to 5 remaining participation years; 
maximum incentive is $63 750 over 6 (not necessarily consecutive) years for EPs; States can 
included additional requirements for meaningful use; available to not only physicians but also 
other health professionals (e.g. nurse practitioners, certified nurse-midwives, dentists, some 
physician assistants). 
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Table 3 Meaningful Use of EHR Technology Objectives and Measures 
Policy Priority Stage 1 Core Set Objectives Stage 1 Measure Stage 2 Core Objectives Stage 2 Measure 
Improving 
quality, safety, 
efficiency, and 
reducing health 
disparities 
Use computerized provider order 
entry (CPOE) for medication 
orders directly entered by any 
licensed healthcare professional 
who can enter orders into the 
medical record per state, local 
and professional guidelines 
More than 30% of unique 
patients with at least one 
medication in their medication 
list seen by the EP have at least 
one medication entered using 
CPOE 
Use CPOE for medication, 
laboratory and radiology orders 
directly entered by any licensed 
healthcare professional who can 
enter orders into the medical 
record per state, local and 
professional guidelines 
More than 60% of medication, 
30% of laboratory, and 30% of 
radiology orders created by the 
EP during the EHR reporting 
period are recorded using CPOE 
Implement drug-drug and drug-
allergy interaction checks 
The EP has enabled this 
functionality for the entire EHR 
reporting period 
  
Generate and transmit 
permissible prescriptions 
electronically 
More than 40% of all permissible 
prescriptions written by the EP 
are transmitted electronically 
using certified EHR technology 
Generate and transmit 
permissible prescriptions 
electronically 
More than 50% of all permissible 
prescriptions written by the EP 
are compared to at least one 
drug formulary and transmitted 
electronically using certified EHR 
technology 
Record demographics: preferred 
language, gender, race, ethnicity, 
date of birth, and date and 
preliminary cause of death in the 
event of mortality 
More than 50% of all unique 
patients seen by the EP have 
demographics as recorded 
structured data 
Record demographics: preferred 
language, sex, race, ethnicity, 
date of birth 
More than 80% of all unique 
patients seen by the EP have 
demographics recorded as 
structured data 
Maintain up-to-date problem list 
of current and active diagnoses 
More than 80% of all unique 
patients seen have at least one 
entry or an indication that no 
problems are known for the 
patient recorded as structured 
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data 
Maintain active medication list More than 80% of all unique 
patients seen by the EP have at 
least one entry or an indication 
that the patient is not currently 
prescribed any medication 
recorded as structured data 
  
Maintain active medication 
allergy list 
More than 80% of all unique 
patients seen by the EP have at 
least one entry or an indication 
that the patient has no known 
medication allergies recorded as 
structured data 
  
Record vital signs: height, weight, 
blood pressure, calculate and 
display BMI, plot and display 
growth charts for children 2-20 
years including BMI 
For more than 50% of all unique 
patients aged 2 and over seen by 
the EP, height, weight, and blood 
pressure are recorded as 
structured data 
Record and chart changes in vital 
signs: height/length and weight 
(no age limit); blood pressure 
(ages 3 and over); calculate and 
display BMI; and plot and display 
growth charts for patients 0-20 
years including BMI 
More than 80% of all unique 
patients seen by the EP have 
blood pressure (for patients age 3 
and over only) and height and 
weight (for all ages) recorded as 
structured data 
Record smoking status for 
patients 13 years or older 
More than 50% of all unique 
patients 13 years or older seen by 
the EP have smoking status 
recorded as structured data 
Record smoking status for 
patients 13 years or older 
More than 80% of all unique 
patients 13 years old or older 
seen by the EP have smoking 
status recorded as structured 
data 
Implement one clinical decision 
support rule and the ability to 
track compliance with the rule 
Implement one clinical decision 
support rule 
Use clinical decision support to 
improve performance on high-
priority health conditions 
1. Implement 5 clinical decision 
support interventions related to 4 
or more CQMs, if applicable, at a 
relevant point in patient care for 
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the entire EHR reporting period 
2. The EP has enabled the 
functionality for drug-drug and 
drug-allergy interaction checks 
for the entire EHR reporting 
period 
Report CQMs to CMS or the 
States 
For 2011, provide aggregate 
numerator, denominator, and 
exclusions through attestation 
For 2012, electronically submit 
clinical quality measures 
  
Engage patients 
and families in 
their healthcare 
Provide patients with an 
electronic copy of their health 
information including diagnostic 
test results, problem list, 
medication lists, medication 
allergies, upon request 
More than 50% of all unique 
patients of the EP who request an 
electronic copy of their health 
information are provided it 
within 3 business days 
Provide patients the ability to 
view online, download, and 
transmit their health information 
within 4 business days of the 
information being available to the 
EP 
1. More than 50% of all unique 
patients seen by the EP during 
the EHR reporting period are 
provided timely (available to the 
patient within 4 business days 
after the information is available 
to the EP) online access to their 
health information 
2. More than 5% of all unique 
patients seen by the EP during 
the EHR reporting period (or their 
authorised representatives) view, 
download, or transmit to a third 
party their health information 
Provide clinical summaries for 
each office visit 
Summaries provided to patients 
for more than 50% of all office 
visits within 3 business days 
Provide clinical summaries for 
patients for each office visit 
Clinical summaries provided to 
patients within one business day 
for more than 50% of office visits 
Improve care Capability to exchange key Performed at least one test of the   
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coordination clinical information (e.g. problem 
list, medication list, allergies, 
diagnostic test results), among 
providers of care and patient 
authorised entities electronically 
certified EHR technology’s 
capacity to electronically 
exchange key clinical information 
Ensure adequate 
privacy and 
security 
protections for 
personal health 
information 
Protect electronic health 
information created or 
maintained by certified EHR 
technology through the 
implementation of appropriate 
technical capabilities 
Conduct or review a security risk 
analysis per 45 CFR 164.308 (a)(1) 
and implement updates as 
necessary and correct identified 
security deficiencies as part of 
the EP’s risk management 
process 
Protect electronic health 
information created or 
maintained by the certified EHR 
technology through the 
implementation of appropriate 
technical capabilities 
Conduct or review a security risk 
analysis in accordance with the 
requirements under 45 CFR 
164.308 (a)(1), including 
addressing the 
encryption/security of data at 
rest and implement security 
updates as necessary and correct 
identified security deficiencies as 
part of its risk management 
process 
  Use secure electronic messaging 
to communicate with patients on 
relevant health information 
A secure message was sent using 
the electronic messaging function 
of certified EHR technology by 
>5% of unique patients seen 
during the EHR reporting period 
Policy Priority Stage 1 Menu Set Objectives Stage 1 Measure Stage 2 Menu Objectives Stage 2 Measure 
Improving 
quality, safety, 
efficiency and 
reducing health 
disparities 
Implement drug-formulary 
checks 
The EP has enabled this 
functionality and has access to at 
least one internal or external 
drug formulary for the entire EHR 
reporting period 
  
Incorporate clinical lab test 
results into certified EHR 
More than 40% of all clinical lab 
test results ordered by the EP for 
Incorporate clinical lab test 
results into certified EHR 
More than 55% of all clinical lab 
tests results ordered by the EP 
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technology as structured data patients seen during the EHR 
reporting period whose results 
are either in a positive/negative 
or numerical format are 
incorporated in certified EHR 
technology as structured data 
technology as structured data  
(Core in Stage 2) 
during the EHR reporting period 
whose results are either in a 
positive/negative or numerical 
format are incorporated in 
certified EHR technology as 
structured data 
Generate lists of patients by 
specific conditions to use for 
quality improvement, reduction 
of disparities, research or 
outreach 
Generate at least one report 
listing patients of the EP with a 
specific condition 
Generate lists of patients by 
specific conditions to use for 
quality improvement, reduction 
of disparities, research or 
outreach 
(Core in Stage 2) 
Generate at least one report 
listing patients of the EP with a 
specific condition 
Send reminders to patients per 
patient preference for 
preventive/follow up care 
More than 20% of all unique 
patients 65 years or older or 5 
years old or younger were sent 
an appropriate reminder during 
the EHR reporting period 
Use clinically relevant 
information to identify patients 
who should receive reminders for 
preventive/follow-up care and 
send these patients the 
reminders, per patient 
preference 
(Core in Stage 2) 
Use EHR to identify and provide 
reminders for preventive/follow-
up care for more than 10% of 
patients with two or more office 
visits in the last 2 years 
  Record electronic notes in patient 
records 
Enter at least one electronic 
progress note created, edited and 
signed by an EP for more than 
30% of unique patients 
  Imaging results consist of the 
image itself and any explanation 
or other accompanying 
information are accessible 
through certified EHR technology 
More than 10% of all scans and 
tests whose result is an image 
ordered by the EP for patients 
seen during the EHR reporting 
period are incorporated into or 
accessible through certified EHR 
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technology 
  Record patient family health 
history as structured data 
More than 20% of all unique 
patients seen by the EP during 
the EHR reporting period have a 
structured data entry for one or 
more first-degree relatives or an 
indication that family health 
history has been reviewed 
Engage patients 
and families in 
their health care 
Provide patients with timely 
electronic access to their health 
information (including lab results, 
problem list, medication lists, 
medication allergies) within 4 
business days of the information 
being available to the EP 
More than 10% of all unique 
patients seen by the EP are 
provided timely (available to the 
patient within 4 business days of 
being updated in their certified 
EHR technology) electronic access 
to their health information 
subject to the EP’s discretion to 
withhold certain information 
  
Use certified EHR technology to 
identify patient-specific 
education resources and provide 
those resources to the patient, if 
appropriate 
More than 10% of all unique 
patients seen by the EP are 
provided patient-specific 
education resources 
Use clinically relevant 
information from certified EHR 
technology to identify patient-
specific education resources and 
provide those resources to the 
patient 
(Core in Stage 2) 
Patient-specific education 
resources identified by certified 
EHR technology are provided to 
patients for more than 10% of all 
unique patients with office visits 
seen by the EP during the EHR 
reporting period 
Improve care 
coordination 
The EP who receives a patient 
from another setting of care or 
provider of care or believes an 
encounter is relevant should 
perform medication 
The EP performs medication 
reconciliation for more than 50% 
of transitions of care in which the 
patient is transitioned into the 
care of the EP 
The EP who receives a patient 
from another setting of care or 
provider of care or believes an 
encounter is relevant should 
perform medication 
The EP performs medication 
reconciliation for more than 50% 
of transitions of care in which the 
patient is transitioned into the 
care of the EP 
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reconciliation reconciliation 
(Core in Stage 2) 
The EP who receives a patient 
from another setting of care or 
provider of care or refers their 
patient to another provider of 
care should provide a summary 
of care record for each transition 
of care or referral 
The EP who transitions or refers 
their patient to another setting of 
care or provider of care provides 
a summary of care record for 
more than 50% of transitions of 
care and referrals 
The EP who transitions their 
patient to another setting of care 
or provider of care or refers their 
patient to another provider of 
care should provide a summary 
of care record for each transition 
of care or referral 
(Core in Stage 2) 
1. The EP who transitions or 
refers their patient to another 
setting of care or provider of care 
provides a summary of care 
record for more than 50% of 
transitions of care and referrals 
2. The EP who transitions or 
refers their patient to another 
setting of care or provider of care 
provides a summary of care 
record either a) electronically 
transmitted to a recipient using 
certified EHR technology or b) 
where the recipient receives the 
summary of care record via 
exchange facilitated by an 
organisation that is a Nationwide 
Health Information Network 
Exchange participant or is 
validated through an Office of the 
National Coordinator of Health 
Information Technology‑
established governance 
mechanism to facilitate exchange 
for 10% of transitions and 
referrals 
3. The EP who transitions or 
refers their patient to another 
setting of care or provider of care 
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must either a) conduct one or 
more successful electronic 
exchanges of a summary of care 
record with a recipient using 
technology that was designed by 
a different EHR developer than 
the sender's, or b) conduct one or 
more successful tests with the 
CMS-designated test EHR during 
the EHR reporting period 
Improve 
population and 
public health 
 
(unless an EP has 
an exception for 
these they must 
complete at least 
one as part of 
their Stage 1 
demonstration of 
the menu set in 
order to be a 
meaningful EHR 
user) 
Capability to submit electronic 
data to immunisation registries or 
immunisation information 
systems and actual submission in 
accordance with applicable law 
and practice 
Performed at least one test of the 
certified EHR technology’s 
capacity to submit electronic data 
to immunisation registries and 
follow-up submission if the test is 
successful (unless none of the 
immunisation registries to which 
the EP submits such information 
have the capacity to receive such 
information electronically) 
Capability to submit electronic 
data to immunisation registries or 
immunisation information 
systems except where prohibited, 
and in accordance with applicable 
law and practice 
(Core in Stage 2) 
Successful ongoing submission of 
electronic immunisation data 
from certified EHR technology to 
an immunisation registry or 
immunisation information system 
for the entire EHR reporting 
period 
Capability to submit electronic 
syndromic surveillance data to 
public health agencies and actual 
submission in accordance with 
applicable law and practice 
Performed at least one test of 
certified EHR technology’s 
capacity to provide electronic 
syndromic surveillance data to 
public health agencies and 
follow-up submission if the test is 
successful (unless none of the 
public health agencies to which 
the EP submits such information 
have the capacity to receive such 
information electronically) 
Capability to submit electronic 
syndromic surveillance data to 
public health agencies except 
where prohibited, and in 
accordance with applicable law 
and practice 
Successful ongoing submission of 
electronic syndromic surveillance 
data from certified EHR 
technology to a public health 
agency for the entire EHR 
reporting period 
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   Capability to identify and report 
cancer cases to a public health 
central cancer registry, except 
where prohibited, and in 
accordance with applicable law 
and practice 
Successful ongoing submission of 
cancer case information from 
certified EHR technology to a 
cancer registry for the entire EHR 
reporting period 
   Capability to identify and report 
specific cases to a specialised 
registry (other than a cancer 
registry), except where 
prohibited, and in accordance 
with applicable law and practice 
Successful ongoing submission of 
specific case information from 
certified EHR technology to a 
specialised registry for the entire 
EHR reporting period 
Source: (CMS, 2012b) 
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Table 4 Meaningful Use of EHR Technology Clinical Quality Measures – Stage 1 Examples 
Core Set CQMs 
Hypertension: blood pressure 
measurement 
Preventive care and screening 
measure pair: a) tobacco use 
assessment, b) tobacco cessation 
intervention 
Adult weight screening and follow-
up 
Alternate Core Set CQMs 
Weight assessment and 
counselling for children and 
adolescents 
Preventive care and screening: 
influenza immunisation for 
patients 50 years old or older 
Childhood immunisation status 
Additional Set CQMs (must complete 3) 
Diabetes: HbA1c poor control Diabetes: low density lipoprotein 
management and control 
Diabetes: blood pressure 
management 
Diabetes: eye exam Diabetes: urine screening Diabetes: foot exam 
Diabetes: HbA1c control (<8.0%) Controlling high blood pressure Chlamydia screening for women 
Heart failure: angiotensin-
converting enzyme inhibitor or 
angiotensin receptor blocker 
therapy for left ventricular systolic 
dysfunction 
Heart failure: beta-blocker therapy 
for left ventricular systolic 
dysfunction 
Heart failure: warfarin therapy 
patients with atrial fibrillation 
Coronary artery disease (CAD): 
beta-blocker therapy for CAD 
patients with prior myocardial 
infarction 
CAD: oral antiplatelet therapy 
prescribed for patients with CAD 
CAD: drug therapy for lowering low 
density lipoprotein cholesterol 
Ischemic vascular disease (IVD): 
blood pressure management 
IVD: use of aspirin or another 
antithrombotic 
IVD: complete lipid panel and low 
density lipoprotein control 
Cervical cancer screening Breast cancer screening Colorectal cancer screening 
Pneumonia vaccination status for 
older adults 
Anti-depressant medication 
management: a) effective acute 
phase treatment, b) effective 
continuation phase treatment 
Primary open angle glaucoma: 
optic nerve evaluation 
Diabetic retinopathy: 
documentation of presence or 
absence of macular oedema and 
level of severity of retinopathy 
Diabetic retinopathy: 
communication with the physician 
managing ongoing diabetes care 
Asthma pharmacologic therapy 
Asthma assessment Appropriate testing for children 
with pharyngitis 
Use of appropriate medications for 
asthma 
Oncology breast cancer: Hormonal 
therapy for stage IC-IIIC oestrogen 
receptor/progesterone receptor 
positive breast cancer 
Oncology colon cancer: 
chemotherapy for stage III colon 
cancer patients 
Prostate cancer: avoidance of 
overuse of bone scan for staging 
low risk prostate cancer patients 
Smoking and tobacco use 
cessation, medical assistance: a) 
Initiation and engagement of 
alcohol and other drug 
Low back pain: use of imaging 
studies 
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advising smokers and tobacco 
users to quit, b) discussing smoking 
and tobacco use cessation 
medications, c) discussing smoking 
and tobacco use cessation 
strategies 
dependence treatment: a) 
initiation, b) engagement 
Prenatal care: screening for human 
immunodeficiency virus 
Prenatal care: anti-D immune 
globulin 
 
Sources: (CMS, 2010, CMS, 2012b, CMS, 2013a)  
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Table 5 Ontario Primary Care Reform Practice Types 
Traditional FFS 
Practices 
• Do not roster patients 
• Do not have to meet defined practice criteria (i.e. size, features) 
• Not eligible to receive performance-based incentive payments 
Family Health 
Networks 
• Introduced in 2002 
• Require minimum of three family physicians 
• Minimum total roster of 2 400 for group of three, financial penalty for rosters 
less than minimum 
• Funded through blended capitation formula 
• Eligible for performance-based incentive payments 
• Preventive services incentives paid to practice, practice then decides how the 
funds are used 
Family Health 
Groups 
• Introduced in 2003 
• Require minimum of three family physicians 
• Formal rostering is voluntary (but required to obtain certain payments) 
• Funded through blended formula where FFS is dominant 
• Physicians are eligible for preventive care incentives and some of the special 
payments 
• Preventive services incentives paid to physicians directly 
Comprehensive 
Care Model 
• Introduced in 2005 
• Include physicians in solo practice 
• Require patient rostering 
• Funded through blended formula where FFS is dominant 
• Physicians are eligible for preventive care incentives, not eligible for special 
payments 
• Preventive services incentives paid to physicians directly 
Family Health 
Organizations 
• Introduced in 2006 (mostly converted from existing Health Service 
Organizations and Primary Care Networks) 
• Require minimum of three family physicians 
• Require patient rostering 
• Funded through blended capitation model 
• Physicians are eligible for all preventive care incentives and all special payments 
• Preventive services incentives paid to physicians directly 
 
Adapted from (Hurley et al., 2011). 
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